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Students of the Supreme Court have been puzzled by the order
issued on April 25, 1988, in Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union1 setting
the case for reargument and requesting the parties to brief and argue
the following question:
Whether or not the interpretation2 of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted
3 by
this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, should be reconsidered?
Runyon was an important civil-fights case that had been continually endorsed by the Court in the twelve years between its decision
and the Patterson order; over one hundred lower court opinions had
t
1.
2.
3.

Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of TIlsa College of Law.
485 U.S. 617 (1988).
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Patterson,485 U.S. at 617 (citation omitted).
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cited Runyon and its progeny.4 In Patterson itself, "[n]either the parties nor the Solicitor General have argued that Runyon should be reconsidered" 5 or questioned that the case was firmly established in
constitutional jurisprudence. Instead, over four vigorous dissenters,
the Patterson Court "asks the parties to rebrief and reargue this case,
focusing not on some neglected subtlety of the issues presented for
review or on any overlooked jurisdictional detail, but on a question
not presented ' 6 - whether Runyon should be overruled.
In his dissent from the Patterson order, Justice Blackmun declared, "I am at a loss to understand the motivation of five Members
of this Court to... consider rewriting well-established law."'7 Constitutional scholars have shared the Blackmun failure to understand
what happened in Patterson. However, materials made available in
Justice Thurgood Marshall's papers 8 now enable us to go behind the
public record of the Patterson case and determine, in part at least,
what happened during the Court's decision process, both on the issue
of reconsidering Runyon and the final decision on whether Runyon
should be overruled.
As will be seen, the prime mover behind the attempt to secure
the reconsideration and overruling of Runyon was Chief Justice Rehnquist. It was the Chief Justice who urged the conference to reconsider
and overrule both Runyon and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,9 the
leading civil-rights decision upon which Runyon itself was based.10
Nevertheless, ultimately even the Justices who agreed that Runyon
and Jones had been decided incorrectly ultimately refused to overrule
those cases.
I.

REHNQUIST AND CIVIL RIGHTS1 1

Among the most controversial Rehnquist Court decisions have
been those dealing with civil rights. Not coincidentally, it was a
dispute over Justice Rehnquist's civil-rights stance that was the chief
4. See id. at 620-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 622 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

7. Id. at 621 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. These papers are now in the Library of Congress. Draft opinions and other nonpublished documents referred to in this article are in these papers [hereinafter Marshall Papers].
9. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
10. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
11. Portions of this section were originally published in Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Jackson, and the Brown Case, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 245 (1989) [hereinafter
REvIEw]. Copyright 1989 by The University of Chicago.
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obstacle to his confirmation as Chief Justice. After he had graduated
from Stanford Law School, Rehnquist served as a Supreme Court law
clerk to Justice Jackson. This was during the 1952 Term, when Brown
v. Boardof Education12 came to the Court. As Jackson's clerk, Rehnquist wrote a memorandum on Brown, headed A Random Thought on
the Segregation Cases and signed "whr."'13 It compared judicial action
to invalidate segregation to the Court's "reading of its own economic
views into the Constitution"' 4 in cases such as Lochner v. New York'"
- "the high water mark.., in protecting" corporations against legislative influence.' 6 According to the memo: "In these cases now
before the Court, the Court is... being asked to read its own sociological views into the Constitution." 7 For the Court to hold segregation invalid here, the memo asserted, would be for it to repeat the
error of the Lochner Court. "If this Court, because its members individually are 'liberal' and dislike segregation, now chooses to strike it
down, it differs from the McReynolds court only in the kinds of litigants it favors and the kinds of special claims it protects."' 8
Rehnquist concluded his memo: "I think Plessy v. Fergusonwas
right and should be re-affirmed. If the fourteenth [sic] Amendment
did not enact Spencer's Social [Statics],19 it just as surely did not enact
Myrddahl's [sic] American Dilemma."20
The Rehnquist memo became an important factor in the Senate
debate on the nominations of Rehnquist both to the Supreme Court
and as Chief Justice. Justice Rehnquist himself maintained that his
Brown memo "was prepared by me at Justice Jackson's request; it was
intended as a rough draft of a statement of his views .... rather than
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Memorandum by Justice Rehnquist (Brown file, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of
Congress) reprinted in Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate on the Nomination of William Hubbs Rehnquist to

be Chief Justice of the United States, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (1986) [hereinafter Nomination of
Rehnquist]. I have discussed the Rehnquist memo more fully in REviEw, supranote 11, at 24547.
14. Nomination of Rehnquist, supra note 13, at 324.
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. Nomination of Rehnquist, supra note 13, at 324.
17. Id. at 325.
18. Id.

19. This, of course, is from the dissent by Justice Holmes in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 75 (1905).
20. Nomination of Rehnquist,supranote 13, at 325. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA

(1944).
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as a statement of my views."" The Rehnquist explanation has been
challenged, particularly during the hearings on his judicial nominations. 2 It is hard not to conclude, as Richard Kluger did in his monumental book on the Brown case, that "one finds a preponderance of
evidence to suggest that the memorandum in question - the one that
threatened to deprive William Rehnquist of his place on the Supreme
Court - was an accurate statement of his own views on segregation,
not those of Robert Jackson." 23
To the evidence so convincingly summarized in the Kluger
book,24 one must add the draft concurrence which Justice Jackson prepared, but never issued, in Brown. It has long been known that Jackson worked on a draft which he intended as the basis for a concurring
Brown opinion. That draft, which has become available in the Jackson
papers at the Library of Congress, 25 appears inconsistent with Rehnquist's assertion that his memo was intended to state Jackson's rather
than his view on the constitutionality of segregation.
The key sentence in the Jackson draft states categorically, "I am
convinced that present-day conditions require us to strike from our
books the doctrine of separate-but-equal facilities and to hold invalid
provisions of state constitutions or statutes which classify persons for
separate treatment in matters of education based solely on possession
of colored blood. '26 At the end of his draft, Justice Jackson repeated
this conclusion, stating, "I favor... enter[ing] a decree that the state
constitutions and statutes relied upon as requiring or authorizing seg'27
regation merely on account of race or color, are unconstitutional.
The Jackson draft shows clearly that the Justice held the view that
school segregation was unconstitutional. He may have recognized, as
the other Justices did, that before Brown the law had been to the contrary. He also had no illusions about the difficulties involved in enforcing a desegregation decision. Still, his draft expressed no doubt on
the correctness of the Brown decision. By the time of the case, he was
21. George Lardner Jr. & Saundra Saperstein, A ChiefJustice-Designatewith Big Ambitions
Even as a Boy, Rehnquist Hoped to 'Change the Government,' WASH. POST, July 6, 1986, at Al
(national weekly ed.).
22. See, eg., Nomination of Rehnquist, supra note 13, at 322, 328-33.
23. RICHARD KLUGER, SnvtPLE JuSTcE 609 (1975).

24. Id. at 606-09.
25. Justice Jackson, Draft Opinion, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Mar. 15,
1954) (Brown file, Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress) [hereinafter Jackson Brown
Draft]. This draft is dealt with in detail in REvmw, supra note 11, at 254-65.

26. REvmw, supra note 11, at 247 (quoting Jackson Brown Draft, supra note 25).
27. Id. at 263 (quoting Jackson Brown Draft, supra note 25).
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plainly ready to announce the principle that segregation was unconstitutional, and he did so in the draft prepared but never issued by him.
It is hard to believe that the man who wrote the sentences holding segregation invalid in his concurring draft held the view only a few
months earlier attributed to him in the Rehnquist memo - that
"Plessy v. Fergusonwas right and should be re-affirmed." 2 So inconsistent, indeed, is this view with the Jackson draft that one is tempted
to ask what might have happened had Justice Jackson's unequivocal
draft statements on the invalidity of segregation been available when
the Senate voted on the Rehnquist nomination to the Supreme Court
or his later nomination as Chief Justice.
I.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND CiVL RIGHTS

29

In 1985, a New York Times reporter asked Justice Rehnquist if his
views on Brown had changed since he wrote the memorandum for
Justice Jackson. 30 The Justice replied, "I think they probably have,"
and that he now accepted Brown as the law of the land.31 Yet he still
maintained, "I think there was a perfectly reasonable argument [presumably that in his memo] the other way."'32
Certainly, as Justice Rehnquist told his interviewer, "Whatever I
wrote for Justice Jackson was obviously a long time ago."'33 Nevertheless, it is clear that, since he has been on the Court, his votes in cases
involving civil rights place him in the right wing of the Court on these
issues.
What is not known outside the Marble Palace is that, as Chief
Justice, Rehnquist has urged even more extreme views within the
Court than have appeared in his published opinions. A major part of
contemporary civil-rights litigation has been based upon laws enacted
during Reconstruction. Among them is the introductory paragraph of
an 1866 statute 34 of which the current version, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, provides "[a]U citizens ...

shall have the same right, in every State and

Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
28. Nomination of Rehnquist, supra note 13, at 325.
29. Portions of this section are derived from BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPU1U-SHED
OPINIONS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT (1996) [hereinafter UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS].
30. John A. Jenkins, The Partisan,A Talk With Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES, March 3,
1985, (Magazine), at 28, 32.

31. Id. at 32.
32. Id.

33. Id.
34. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 (1988)).
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lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property. 35 In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.,36 the Court held that this statute prohibits racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of property.37 As such, it forbids a
private development company to refuse to sell a home to someone
because he is black.38
The later case of Runyon v. McCrary39 also dealt with a portion
of the introductory paragraph of the 1866 law, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which provides that all persons "shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens. ' 40 Runyon ruled that this statute prohibits racial dis41
crimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.
The Court found that a private school's denial of admission on racial
grounds violated the statute.42 The relationship the pupils' parents
had sought to enter into was contractual in name, and by denying
them the right to enter into the contracts, the school had discriminated contrary to the statute.43
In Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union,an as seen, the Court heard
argument on "[w]hether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered."'45 Justice Marshall's papers contain sketchy notes of two of the
Pattersonpostargument conferences. The relevant portions state: 1)
"CJ - Runyon was wrong and BRW was correct - Overrule Runyon;"
46
and 2) "CJ - Overrule Jones and Mayo [sic]."
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist not only urged the Patterson conference to overrule Runyon, he also told the conference that the
Court should overrule Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. as well. The
Rehnquist position in this respect was not a new one, since he had
urged the same view in Runyon itself. He had told the conference
there, "I'm satisfied [the civil-rights statute at issue] wasn't intended
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Id. at 413.
Id at 421.
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 172-73.
485 U.S. 617 (1988).
Id. at 617 (citation omitted).
Marshall Papers, supra note 8.
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to apply to private action"'4 7 and had joined the Runyon dissent of
48
Justice White, which rejected the Jones approach.
What is not generally known outside the Court is that the Chief
Justice sent a letter to Justice White on a 1987 case involving § 198149
in which he stated, "I once again question the soundness of our opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., which held that this class was
protected not merely against state action but against action by other
private individuals." 50
Soon afterwards, Justice Powell sent a letter to Justice White stating, "I... share the reservation expressed by the Chief Justice in his
join note of April 7. In retrospect, I think our cases following Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. misconstrued §§ 1981 and 1982."I' Justice
O'Connor also wrote to Justice White that she "shared [the] reservations about the Court's construction" of the 1866 law.52
The Rehnquist position on Runyon and Jones was consequently
one that he had followed consistently over the years. However,
before we discuss the Justices' reaction to the Chief Justice's Patterson
recommendation to overrule Runyon and Jones, more should be said
about those cases and the question of whether they were correctly
decided.
III. JONES V.

ALFRED H.

MA YER Co.53

After the 1987 Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor notes to Justice
White were circulated, Justice Blackmun also wrote to White: "I am
somewhat amused at the exchanges in the correspondence concerning
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. My amusement is due to my personal
involvement in the case. If one just hangs on long enough, he may see
almost anything happen." 54
47. Conference notes made available to me on confidential basis.
48. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 192 (White, J., dissenting).
49. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
50. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Byron White, United States
Supreme Court (Apr. 7, 1987) (copy on file with the Tulsa Law Journal) (citation omitted).
51. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice White, United States Supreme Court (Apr. 9,1987)
(copy on file with the Tulsa Law Journal)(citation omitted) [hereinafter Powell-White].
52. Letter from Justice O'Connor to Justice White, United States Supreme Court (Apr. 9,
1987) (copy on file with the Tulsa Law Journal)[hereinafter O'Connor-White].
53. Portions of this section are derived from UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 29 &
BERNARD SCi-HvARTZ, SUPER Cmum'

EARL WARREN AND

HIS SUPREME COURT

(1983)

[hereinafter SUPER CHIEF].

54. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice White, United States Supreme Court (Apr. 13,
1987) (copy on file with the Tulsa Law Journal) (citation omitted).
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Justice Blackmun's reference to "my personal involvement" in
Jones was a reference to the fact that he had written the lower court
opinion that had been reversed in that case." The Blackmun Jones
opinion, rendered when he was on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for damages and
an injunction because defendant, a private development company,
had refused to sell a home in defendant's housing development to
plaintiffs since they were black.56 In particular, the Blackmun opinion
held that the refusal did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1982 because that statutory provision was based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was applicable only when "state action" was present. 7 State action was not present in Jones, according
to Blackmun, because it was conceded that defendant had not received any state or federal aid or financing in constructing the housing
development.5 8 Essentially, the Blackmun Jones opinion ruled that
§ 1982 did not reach racial discrimination in private housing5 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones to consider
whether the court of appeals had been correct in "concluding that
§ 1982 applies only to state action and does not reach private refusals
to sell." ' 6 At the time, constitutional lawyers thought that the case
might well lead to a broadening of the state-action concept to include
such a case. As I wrote just after certiorari was granted in Jones, "the
high bench has agreed to decide whether the action of a private home
builder in refusing to sell to a Negro is reached by the Equal-Protection Clause. The decision here may well make for a further expansion
of the concept of 'state action ....
A majority of the Justices apparently felt the same way after they
heard the Jones argument. At the postargument conference, Chief
Justice Warren urged reversal because, as he saw it, the concept of
"state action" had been expanded sufficiently to cover this case. He
referred to Marsh v. Alabama,62 where action by a company-owned
town was ruled within the "state action" concept, because the private
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 409 (1978).
See id. at 34-35, 46.
Id. at 43.
See id. at 35-36.
See id. at 45.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 (1968).

61. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A
STATES: RiGHTs OF THE PERSON

COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED

at vi (1968).

62. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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owner exercised governmental functions in running the town.6 3 To
Warren, a housing development was, in effect, the equivalent of a municipality. The Chief Justice said that he would "decide on the same
theory we decided in Marsh v. Alabama. They have [governmental]
power and are to take care of parks and streets, etc."'
At the Jones conference, the Justices were willing to reverse on
the Marsh ground - including Justices Harlan and White who ultimately dissented. 65 Such a reversal did not occur, however, because
Justice Stewart argued for a far-reaching theory that permitted § 1982
to be applied to the case even though only private discrimination was
involved.
At the argument on the case, counsel for Jones had relied specifically on § 1982 and had argued that it was aimed at individual, as well
as state, action. Justice Stewart inquired whether the provision was
not originally enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, which contains no language limiting its operation to "state action." Counsel answered that it was so enacted. Stewart then asked, "If this law was
valid under the Thirteenth Amendment, why do we bother with state
'66
action?
Justice Stewart told the Jones conference that he would go on a
ground "much broader than Marsh," namely, that the defendant's refusal to sell because Jones was black violated § 1982.67 That statute,
Stewart pointed out, "was enacted before the Fourteenth Amendment
and under section 2 of the Thirteenth. ' 68 According to Justice Stewart, section 1982 was valid under the Thirteenth Amendment as a prohibition of the barriers to acquisition of property that were incidents
of slavery before the Civil War. As such, § 1982 could reach private
discrimination, since the Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains no language limiting its operation to "state action."
"Therefore," said Stewart, "I think this is a valid law operating against
'69
private people.
Chief Justice Warren's first reaction to the Stewart conference approach was dubious. Warren told the conference that he would still
prefer to decide on the Marsh theory. He noted that Congress was
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 506.
SUPER CHIE, supra note 53, at 702 (alteration in original).
See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36 U.S.LW. 3385, 3385 (U.S. April 9, 1968).
SUPER CHrEi, supranote 53, at 702-03.
Id.at 703.
Id.
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then passing the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which would prohibit housing discrimination. "Doing it that way," the Chief Justice stated,
"Congress can take care of it under the pending legislation. ' 70
The other Justices, however, except for Justices Harlan and
White, were willing to follow Justice Stewart. The new consensus was
summarized by Justice Black, who said, "I would reverse on section
1982. I think the statute was passed by Congress to cover this."' 71
Chief Justice Warren also went along. He assigned the opinion to Justice Stewart, who announced the reversal and the new theory supporting it on the last day of the 1967 Term. Justice Harlan, joined by
Justice White, issued a dissent that termed the decision "ill-considered
'72
and ill-advised.
As explained by Justice Stewart's opinion, Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. held that "§ 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as
well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute,
thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment. ' 73 Thus, in Jones, § 1982 prohibited the
private development company from refusing to sell a house to plaintiff
74
because he was black.
The Jones opinion analyzed both the language and the legislative
history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, from which § 1982 is derived, and
concluded that Congress had intended both to reach refusals to sell
property to a black person because of his race and to reach such action even where it involved purely private discrimination that did not
come within the "state action" concept.' Section 1982 was thus interpreted to "prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or
rental of property - discrimination by private owners as well as discrimination by public authorities. '76
Justice Stewart's Jones opinion went on to hold that "Congress
has power under the Constitution to do what § 1982 purports to do:
to prohibit all racial discrimination, private and public, in the sale and
rental of property. '77 That was true because the 1866 Civil Rights Act
was enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, which, unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment has no "state action" limitation: "Thus, the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id. at 413.
74. Id. at 421.
75. Id at 436.
76. Id. at 421.
77. Id at 437.
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fact that § 1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional
problem.

78

But how could an amendment which only prohibited slavery and
involuntary servitude serve as the basis for a civil-rights statute forbidding racial discrimination in the sale of property? Justice Stewart answered that, while the Thirteenth Amendment itself abolished slavery,
its second section gave Congress the "power to enforce [the amendment] by appropriate legislation. ' 79 This section, Jones ruled,

"clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper

for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery."' 80 Furthermore,
"Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally
to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery"'" and
to pass laws prohibiting them. In this case, Congress could reasonably
conclude that the badges of slavery included restraints upon the fundamental right "to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live
wherever a white man can live." 82
IV.

RuWYON V. MCCRARY

Soon after Jones, a commentator predicted that the Stewart reasoning in Jones could also apply to the § 1981 guaranty of "the same
right ...

to make and enforce contracts ...
'83

as is enjoyed by white

citizens.
"[B]y the Court's technique of construction, the right 'to
make and enforce contracts' guaranteed by the 1866 Act should prevent a restaurant or hotel management from refusing on grounds of
race to 'make a contract' for service with a Negro. ' 84
Eight years later, this prediction was borne out when the Court
decided Runyon v. McCrary.85 The action there was brought by the
parents of black children who were denied admission to private
schools because of their race.86 The Court, with Justice Stewart again
writing the opinion, held that § 1981 prohibits private schools from
78. Id. at 438.
79. Id. at 438-39.
80. Id. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
81. Id. at 440.
82. Id. at 443.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
84. Louis Henkin, Foreword On DrawingLines, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 85 (1968) (footnote
omitted).
85. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).

86. Id. at 163-64.
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denying admission to prospective students because they are black.87
Indeed, wrote Stewart, the racial discrimination practiced by the
schools here "amounts to a classic violation of § 1981. The parents...
sought to enter into contractual relationship[s] with [the schools],...
[b]ut neither school offered services on an equal basis to white and
nonwhite students. 88
The Runyon opinion followed Jones in holding that § 1981 applied to private contracts, stating that the Jones "holding necessarily
implied that... § 1981 likewise reaches purely private acts of racial
discrimination." 89 Similarly, Jones was relied on to answer the question of whether, so interpreted, section 1981 was constitutional. Jones,
the Runyon Court declared, had settled "'that the power vested in
Congress to enforce [the Thirteenth Amendment] by appropriate legislation' ... includes'the power to enact laws 'direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State
legislation or not."' 90
V.

INTERPRETATION OR PERVERSION?

In his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's survey of the
Supreme Court's 1967 Term, Louis Henkin sharply criticized the Jones
decision: "[O]ne may properly ask why the Court could not resist the
temptation to find in [§ 1982] what, by a fair reading, no Congress
ever put there." 91 Indeed, Henkin asserts, "The Court failed to distinguish between what meaning words will carry and what they will not,
between interpretation and perversion, between the judicial function
and that of Congress."' 92
A few years later, Charles Fairman, in his Holmes Devise volume
on the Court during Reconstruction, devoted a lengthy chapter to the
history and meaning of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (from which §§ 1981
and 1982 are derived).93 His masterful treatment demonstrates, virtually beyond doubt, that Jones was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the 1866 statute. "In Jones v. Mayer," Fairman concluded,
paraphrasing Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass,
87. Id.at 172.
88. Id.at 172-73.
89. Id. at 170.
90. ld.
at 179 (quoting Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968)).
91. Henkin, supra note 84, at 86.
92. Id
93. See e.g., CriXRLEs FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED
STATES: RECONSTRUCrION AND REUNION 1864-1868, at 1207-1300 (1971).
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the Court appears to have had no feeling for the truth of history,
but only to have read it through the glass of the Court's own purpose. It allowed itself to believe impossible things - as though the
dawning enlightenment of 1968 could be ascribed to the Congress of
a century agone. 94

The Jones decision not only revived the previously obscure 1866
Civil Rights Act (which even in its own day had virtually been consigned to legal oblivion) but interpreted that statute in a manner
which had never been urged before, much less accepted by, any court.
Only two months before the Jones decision, Congress finally took
what it thought was the momentous step of enacting the "first" federal
fair housing law in the Civil Rights Act of 1968.91 With Jones, however, Congress and the country learned that the effort on Capitol Hill
to work out the boundaries of fair housing had been redundant, for
the nation already had such a law in the 1866 statute and one which,
unlike the 1968 act, contained no exemptions.
The goal sought by the Court in Jones - elimination of racial
discrimination which "herds men into ghettos and makes their ability
to buy property turn on the color of their ski"

96 -

is so desirable

that it may seem a mere cavil to wonder whether it should be attained
by judicial reliance upon a half-hidden statute which had almost never
before been invoked. If the statute was intended to have this effect, it
is astounding that it was not used when its purpose was fresh in the
minds of those who passed the law. Both the legislative history of the
1866 Civil Rights Act and the situation with which it was intended to
deal, indicate that it had two main purposes: to make Negroes citizens 97 and to give them the citizen's right to make contracts, bring
actions, and own property. 98 Before the Thirteenth Amendment,
slaves could not own property, and after emancipation the Southern
states enacted Black Codes to perpetuate this disability. This was the
"incident of slavery" which the 1866 statute was aimed at, relying for
its enforcement on the Thirteenth Amendment.
When Congress enacted legislation declaring that blacks shall
have "'[t]he same right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to ...

purchase.., property,' [it intended only] to mean the same legal right,
94. Id. at 1258.
95. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
96. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442-43 (1968).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).

98. 1 BERNARD
99 (1970).
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the same capacity granted by law."99 It was not contemplated that the
former slave was being given a legal right to compel an unwilling
seller to convey - a thing no citizen could compel in 1866 and which
was completely alien to the individualist law of that day. Indeed, both
in 1866 and today, no white person has had any right to have a seller
sell to him if he does not wish to; nor is he protected by law from the
seller's capricious discrimination.
If blacks are given "the same right ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens ... to ...purchase ... property,"' 100 how can this language
confer upon them any greater right? As Fairman ended his discussion
of the matter:
If the 1860's are to be called to reprove the practices of the 1960's,
let the lesson be restrained and truthful: that a Congress reflecting
a wide range of opinion determined that the members of the emancipated race were now citizens of the national community, and secured to them the equal capacities and immunities that at the
moment seemed appropriate.10
There was no intent to give the enfranchised race more than equal
capacities in the purchase of property.
The Jones-Runyon interpretation of the 1866 statute renders all
the subsequent civil-rights amendments and statutes redundant. In
particular, it makes the key statute in the field, the Civil Rights Act of
1964, superfluous. 102 That law prohibits places of public accommodation from discriminating on the basis of race in selling goods and services.' 03 The Jones-Runyon interpretation makes this prohibition
unnecessary. In addition, under Runyon, the right "to make and enforce contracts" protected by § 1981 "should prevent a restaurant or
hotel ... from refusing ... to 'make a contract' for service with a
Negro."'" That construction also "should prevent any employer from
refusing 'to make a contract' of employment with a Negro; and the
fair employment provisions of the 1964 Act likewise become
superfluous."' 105
99. See Henkin, supra note 84, at 85 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) which contains substantially the same meaning as the original legislation).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
101. FAimAN,supra note 93, at 1259.
102. Henkin, supra note 84, at 85.
103. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201-07,'78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 & 42 U.S.C. (1988)).
104. Henkin, supra note 84, at 85.
105. Id. at 85-86 (footnotes omitted).
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VI.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION

One can go further and wonder whether the Jones-Runyon interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment also makes the Enforcement
Clauses of the other postbellum amendments superfluous. Denial of
equal protection and the franchise were as much "badges" or "incidents" of slavery as denial of the right to contract and to purchase
property. 0 6 If so, under Jones-Runyon, statutes such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 could have been
enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, without any need to rely
upon any other constitutional provision. "For nought, then, did Congress struggle, for example, in the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 to link,
and to limit, what it did to interstate commerce or to state action.
Complete authority for what it did and more existed in the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment [sic].' 0 7
One can go further and ask why, under the Jones-Runyon approach, the Thirteenth Amendment does not, of its own force, bar all
discrimination, public and private, as a "badge" or "instrument" of
slavery. The Court in Jones did not go that far, holding only that
"Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally
to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
08
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation.'
Logically, nevertheless, it is difficult to see the reason for the distinction. If "slavery" in the Thirteenth Amendment includes "all
badges and incidents of slavery," it is hard to see why the amendment
does not, by itself, prohibit not only the former but the latter as well.
If that were true, it would, of course, make the Fourteenth aild Fifteenth Amendments themselves completely redundant and the same
would be true of all the civil-rights laws enacted by Congress, starting
with the 1866 Act itself.
Before Jones, the Court had never accepted the argument that
private discrimination was a "badge" or "incident" of slavery that
came either within the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition or the
Congressional enforcement power.'0 9 It is true that, in the Congressional debate on the amendment, there were suggestions of an intent
106. See the leading prebellum work on the subject, 1 THOMAS R. R. COBB, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY INTHE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA 83-84,240,242-43,247
(Savannah, W. Thome Williams 1858).
107. Henkin, supra note 84, at 87 (footnote omitted).
108. Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968).
109. See Henkin, supra note 84, at 86-87.
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to abolish not only the institution of slavery itself but also "the necessary incidents of slavery," 110 but no one expressed anything like the
Jones view that the amendment could be used to reach private discriminations in the sale of property."'
During the ratification process, the Governor of South Carolina
wrote to President Andrew Johnson that his state feared that section 2
of the amendment "may be construed to give Congress power of local
legislation over the negroes."" 2 Secretary of State Seward replied
that the state's objection was "querulous and unreasonable, because
that clause is really restraining in its effect, instead of enlarging the
powers of Congress."" 3 South Carolina subsequently ratified the
amendment, stating the qualification "[tjhat any attempt by Congress
towards legislating upon the political status of former slaves, or their
civil relations, would be contrary to the Constitution of the United
States as it now is, or as it would be altered by the proposed amendment. 1" 4 Alabama" 5 and Florida also ratified "with the understanding that it does not confer upon Congress the power to legislate upon
the political status of freedmen.""16 Mississippi stated an even
broader qualification, ratifying with the condition that the amendment
"shall not be construed as a grant of power to Congress to legislate in
117
regard to the freedmen."
While not legally binding, the stated qualifications, as well as
Seward's interpretation for the Executive, are indicative of the intent
of those who ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. They are certainly
far narrower than the 1968 Supreme Court holding." 8 So far as can
be seen, the Court itself was unaware of this aspect of the amendment's history when it decided the Jones case.

110. 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RioTS

74 (1970) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong, 1st Sess. 1440 (1864) (statement of Sen. Harlan).
111. But see FAIRmAN, supra note 93, at 1257-59.
112. EDWARD McPHERSON, A POLITICAL MANUAL FOR 1866 AND 1867 OF EXECUTIVE,
LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, POLITICO-MILITARY, AND GENERAL FACTS 22-23 (Washington, D.C.,
McGill & Witherow 1867).
113. Id. at 23. Seward was doubtless wrong in interpreting § 2 as a restraint, but his reply
does show that the executive view on the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment was a narrow one.
114. L
115. Id. at 21.
116. Id. at 25.
117. LAWANDA Cox & JOHN H. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE 1865-1866, at

170 (1963).
118. See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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PATTERSON AND STARE DECISIS"

9

At the postargument conference in Runyon v. McCrary, Justices
White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens indicated doubts
about the Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. holding that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act applied to private racial discrimination. Justices Powell
and Stevens were, however, troubled by the fact that the Court had
decided in Jones that that was the correct interpretation of the statute.
Justice Powell told the conference, "If there was a majority to reconsider [the] question,... I'd join it."' 120 Justice Stevens said, "I think
Jones v. Mayer was wrongly decided - all they did was give freed
slaves equality in certain ways. But [the] cases are against me [and]
thus my problem is stare decisis.' 121 Justices Powell and Stevens repeated these views in the Runyon concurrences issued by them.
As seen above, Justice Powell restated his opinion that Jones had
been wrongly decided in his 1987 letter to Justice White who had dissented, with Justice Rehnquist, in Runyon. As in Runyon, however,
Powell indicated in his letter that stare decisis overrode his view on
the correctness of Jones, writing: "[I]f the 'slate were clean' I would
be inclined to agree with your view."' 22 The Powell letter "went on to
say, however, that it was 'too late' to reexamine the prior precedents.
John... also stated that he thought these precedents were 'incorrectly
decided', but he concluded that it would be inadvisable to overrule
Jones and its progeny."'12 The Powell letter concluded, "I am not prepared - at least without reargument - to consider overruling the
prior cases."' 24 In Justice O'Connor's letter to Justice White already
referred to, in which she stated her "reservations about the Court's
construction of... §§ 1981 and 1982," Justice O'Connor also wrote,
"If it takes reargument to reach the question, I for one am willing to
agree to it."'12
When the motion was made in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
to order reargument on whether Runyon v. McCrary should be reconsidered, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White (both of whom
119. Portions of this section are derived from UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 29.
120. Conference notes made available to me on a confidential basis.
121. Id.
122. Powell-White, supra note 51 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
123. Id. (quoting Runyon V. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
124. Id.
125. O'Connor-White, supra note 52.
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had dissented in Runyon), Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor had in12 6
dicated, at the least, reservations about both Runyon and Jones.
Justice O'Connor had written specifically that she would vote for a
motion to reconsider. If the others voted the same way, there would
be a majority for reargument. Even if one of them did not vote for
the reconsideration, (in view of his statement at the Runyon conference, Justice Stevens probably voted against), the Chief Justice could
pick up the lost vote from Justices Scalia and Kennedy, who were
more likely to vote his way.
Yet even if the majority voted to hear argument on whether Runyon should be reconsidered, that did not necessarily mean that the
Court would agree with the Chief Justice that Runyon should be overruled. As it turned out, even the Justices who agreed with the Rehnquist view that Runyon had been wrongly decided, refused to go along
with the Chief Justice and overrule that case. In their view, even if
Runyon (and presumably Jones as well) had been decided incorrectly,
the "problem," as Justice Stevens had put it at the Runyon conference
was stare decisis.
In Pattersonitself, more was at issue than whether Runyon should
be reconsidered. The merits involved the question of whether § 1981
applied to the facts of the case.'" 7 Petitioner in Patterson had been
employed by respondent credit union for ten years.128 She brought an
action under § 1981 alleging that respondent "had harassed her, failed
clerk position, and then
to promote her to an intermediate accounting
29
discharged her, all because of her race."'
The conference on October 14, 1988, voted by a bare majority
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy) to reverse. 130 The Justices not only rejected the Chief Justice's plea to
overrule Runyon, the conference majority also refused to accept his
interpretation that racial harassment was not actionable under the
statute. Three days later, Justice Brennan, senior in the majority, assigned the opinion to himself.
Justice Brennan circulated a draft opinion of the Court on December 3, 1988. On the merits, the draft found for petitioner and vacated the decision below. The key issue, as stated in the draft, was
126. Justice Powell was no longer on the Court.
127. See Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 168 (1989).
128. Id. at 169.
129. Id.
130. Justice Marshall, Conference notes on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989) (Oct. 14 1988).
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"whether a plaintiff may state a cause of action under § 1981 based
upon allegations that her employer harassed her because of her
race."' 131 In addition, Justice Brennan's draft opinion refused to limit
§ 1981 to the formation of a contract. Instead, it held that the statutory scope extended to conduct by the employer after the contract
relation had been established, including racially motivated breach of
the contract's terms or the imposition of discriminatory working
conditions. 32
Since the Brennan draft opinion of the Court ruled as it did on
the merits, it also refused to overrule Runyon v. McCrary. The draft
contained a statement of the reasons why Runyon should not be overruled that is far more complete than the treatment of the subject in
either the ultimate opinion of the Court or the final Brennan dissent
in Patterson.33 It is a pity that it was never published, for it contains a
discussion of stare decisis and the exceptions to its doctrine that merits
comparison with the already classic analysis of stare decisis in the joint
opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey.'3
My summary of the Brennan draft on stare decisis will focus upon
those portions not contained in the Justice's published Patterson dissent. The draft starts with a typical judicial encomium to stare decisis:
"[I]t serves important societal interests in fairness, stability, and predictability in the law . . . and in efficient judicial decisionmaking.

Through adherence to stare decisis, 'we ensure that the law will not
merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelli' 35
gible fashion.""1
Nevertheless, "we have identified circumstances in which we will
recognize an exception to that doctrine."'136 That is the case because
"the alternative to a somewhat relaxed doctrine of stare decisis is stagnation, or at least an unsatisfactory resort to drawing ever finer lines
of distinction."' 3 7 Stare decisis, however, remains the rule. "It remains ... the heavy burden of a litigant urging that we overrule a
131. Justice Brennan, Draft Opinion, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
(Nov. 3, 1988), reprinted in UNPUBLISHED OPwIIoNs, supra note 29, at 203, 224 [hereinafter

Brennan Draft].
132. Id. at 224-25.
133. See id. at 222-23.
134. 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808-09 (1992).
135. Brennan Draft, supranote 131, at 205-06 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 256 (1986)).
136. Id. at 206.
137. Id. at 207.
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precedent to demonstrate
that it falls within the scope of [the] excep'138
tions to stare decisis.'
In Patterson, the Brennan draft goes on, "Considerations of stare
decisis... require that we defer to our prior and now long-standing
interpretation of § 1981, absent compelling reasons not to do so....
[T]here is no 'special justification'... for a departure from... Runyon."'1 3 9 To be sure, "[s]tare decisis will not save a statutory precedent
that is without foundation."1 40 But Runyon's interpretation of the
statute, "though disputable, lies well outside these exceptions to stare
decisis recognized for inadequately considered or patently unfounded
decisions." " ' Indeed, Justice Brennan affirms, the Runyon interpretation was "based upon a full and considered review of the statute's
language and legislative history, assisted by careful briefing, and...
this interpretation, though not inevitable, is by no means an implausible one."' 42
The Brennan Patterson draft not only holds that stare decisis requires the reaffirmation of Runyon, it also goes out of its way (in more
detail than in the published Brennan dissent) to find that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. was correctly decided. The draft specifically agrees
with Jones "that Congress said enough about the injustice of private
discrimination, and the need to end it, to show that it did indeed intend the [1866] Civil Rights Act to sweep that far."'1 43 In fact, the
Brennan analysis leads the draft to state,
In sum, although Jones and Runyon both resolved what are assuredly close questions of statutory interpretation, we are unable to
conclude that either the decision in Jones that.., the 1866 Act was
intended to reach private discrimination, or the decision in Runyon
...
was patently wrong and thus within the acknowledged exception
to stare decisis that allows us to correct past errors. 14
A contrary result would defeat the very goal of stare decisis.
The entire purpose of the policy of stare decisis ... is to avoid the
uncertainty that would result from our intermittent reconsideration

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 217.
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of such questions. We do not believe our long-standing interpretation of § 1981 to prohibit private discrimination has been shown to
be so dubious as to trigger an exception to this sound policy. 145
Finally, in a draft section paralleled by a shorter treatment in the
final Brennan dissent, the Justice declares, "We are equally unpersuaded that Runyon v. McCrary falls within the exception to stare decisis for precedents that have proved 'outdated .... unworkable, or
otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious reconsideration." 1 46 The
draft notes that "[w]ith the passage of time, a statutory precedent
sometimes becomes so problematic as to appear ripe for reconsideration. The Court has in those circumstances recognized an exception to
the dictates of stare deciiss ... ."147 The following examples are given:

The court has overruled statutory precedents because the premises
underlying a decision have been rendered untenable by subsequent
congressional or judicial action; because a decision has come to appear inconsistent with another line of authority; and because experience has shown a14precedent to be seriously at odds with
congressional policy. P
However, the Brennan draft states, "None of these considerations is present here. On the contrary," the draft concludes, in language similar to that in Justice Brennan's published dissent,
Runyon is entirely consonant with our society's deep commitment
to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the
color of her skin.... In the past, this Court has overruled decisions
antagonistic to our Nation's commitment to the ideal of a society in
which a person's opportunities do not depend on her race ....

and

we decline now to abandon a statutory construction so in harmony
with that ideal.' 49

The Brennan draft's treatment of stare decisis convinced the
others, with the result that Chief Justice Rehnquist definitely lost his
battle to have the Patterson Court overrule the Jones and Runyon
cases. Even Justice White, who had dissented in both Runyon and
Jones and had been, next to the Chief Justice, the strongest advocate
of the assertion that they had been decided incorrectly, went along
with the Pattersonrefusal to overrule the two cases. After he had read
the Brennan draft opinion of the Court, Justice White circulated his
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 222 (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 266 (1986)).
Id.
Id. at 222-23 (citations omitted).
Id. at 223-24 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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own draft opinion on January 12, 1989, concurring in part and dissenting in part. It began:
I agree with the Court that our decision in Runyon v. McCrary
should not now be overruled. Though I dissented in Runyon, and
continue to believe the Court was wrong in that case, no arguments
have been presented here that merit reversing that decision, particularly in light of our rule "that considerations of stare decisis weigh
heavily in the area of statutory interpretation". Consequently, I join
Part I of the Court's opinion. 150
In other words, Justice White joined the portion of the Brennan draft
relying on stare decisis in refusing to overrule Runyon. In these circumstances, Chief Justice Rehnquist decided also to join the final Patterson opinion of the Court, which like Justice Brennan's draft, also
expressly declined to overrule Runyon.' 5 '
The Chief Justice may have been more willing to join the final
Patterson opinion because the Brennan opinion on the merits, with
which Rehnquist disagreed, lost its majority. That occurred when Justice Kennedy sent around a draft dissent on April 17, which meant
that Justice Kennedy had changed his conference vote on the case.
The Kennedy draft took a restrictive view of the reach of § 1981 - in
effect adopting the confined conference view asserted by Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
Justice Kennedy's draft dissent meant that there was now a bare
majority to hold for the employer against the claim that the alleged
racial harassment violated § 1981. This was recognized by Justice
Brennan himself, when he wrote to the other Justices who had joined
his draft Pattersonopinion: "Dear Thurgood, John, and Harry: Tony's
dissent leaves me without a Court on Part II of my opinion in this
case, dealing with the harassment claim.'

52

Justice Kennedy could

now issue his opinion as the opinion of the Court, which he announced on June 15, 1989. Justice Brennan had to redraft his opinion
as one "concurring in part and dissenting in part."
Thus, Patterson came down as a victory for the more restricted
Rehnquist interpretation of the civil rights statute. But Pattersonwas
150. Justice White, Draft Opinion, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1988)
(Jan. 12, 1989), reprinted in UNPUBUSHED OPINIONS, supra note 29, at 237 (citation omitted)
(quoting Alliance Brick Co., 431 U.S. 720,736 (1977)). This opinion was later withdrawn. Letter
from Justice white to Justice Kennedy, United States Supreme Court (May 17, 1989) (copy on
file with the author).
151. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989).
152. UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supranote 29, at 258 (quoting Letter from Justice Brennan to
Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, United States Supreme Court (May 1, 1989)).
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more important as a defeat for the continuing Rehnquist effort to
have Runyon and Jones overruled. Indeed, since Pattersonthe Chief
Justice has not renewed his effort to cast those decisions into the
limbo of discarded cases. Correctly decided or not, Jones and Runyon
remain as pillars of present-day civil-rights jurisprudence.
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